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The Future of Environmental "Rule of Law"
Litigation and There Is One
A. DAN TARLOCK*
United States environmental law is founded on three funda-
mental premises, all of which are now partially unraveling. Sim-
ply put, the three principal and related objectives of the early
environmental movement were to open the courts to NGO suits to
challenge the failure of federal and state agencies to consider ade-
quately the environmental consequences of their actions, to feder-
alize environmental protection to the maximum extent possible,
and to solve most problems by the application of state-of-the-art-
plus technology. All three objectives succeeded beyond the wildest
expectations of the pioneering architects of environmental protec-
tion, and these objectives remain the foundation of modern envi-
ronmental law. These objectives, however, are insufficient to
sustain environmental law in the twenty-first century.
Since its meteoric rise in the late 1960s and early 1970s, en-
vironmentalism has become a mature political movement. In ad-
dition, environmental law has become a discrete area of law and
legal practice. Compared to many other social movements of the
now mythic "60s", the sustained success of environmentalism is
astounding. Large segments of society have accepted the basic
premise that we should conserve biodiversity and minimize the
risks of media exposure to harmful pollutants, especially toxic
substances. A complex but unintegrated web of regulatory pro-
grams has been put in place by Congress and the states to ad-
vance these objectives. So complete has been the rhetorical
triumph of environmentalism that the socially acceptable debate
is confined to second order issues such as the definition of protec-
tion objectives with greater scientific rationality and the search
for more efficient, effective and fairer means to achieve them.'
The tone of the debate is, however, deceiving.
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965 Stan-
ford University.
1. Environmentalists have been able to draw on the progressive conservation
tradition that conservation issues are above politics, see EDMUND MORRIs, THEODORE
REx 514-518 (2001), that resource use issues are above politics to help frame the envi-
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The relatively narrow, but fierce, band of political environ-
mental protection debate masks the deeper, more profound
stresses in environmentalism and environmental law as it contin-
ues to evolve. In 2000, I was privileged to deliver the Lloyd K.
Garrison lecture at Pace University School of Law. Using this op-
portunity to examine the stresses that are eroding the utility of
"rule of law" litigation, I argued that the sustainability of this
foundational strategy is open to question for two primary rea-
sons.2 First, the strategy was always a fiction because courts were
creating, not "finding" law. All fictions break down over time as
the need for them decreases and the fiction becomes more trans-
parent. Second, the future evolution of environmental law sug-
gests that the "rule of law" litigation strategy will be less effective
in the future because environmental protection is evolving as it
enters its second generation. 3 Several non-legal changes are con-
verging which weaken the effectiveness of uniform, centralized,
technology-forcing command and control regulation.
My argument rests on three premises, one normative and two
positive. The normative one is that organized environmentalism
is still driven by the idea that effective environmental protection
will result from stopping or delaying bad activities. This is a pow-
erful idea, but it is ultimately self-limiting because it makes it dif-
ficult to move to a positive vision of good environmental
protection. NEPA litigation has its uses but it does not directly
lead to effective, long-term environmental protection.4 In short,
environmental law is long on process and short on substance, es-
pecially with respect to biodiversity conservation. We lack an af-
firmative vision of the right balance between humans and natural
systems and thus much environmentalism remains reactive
rather than pro-active. The long-term future of environmental
law will depend on more individual participation in sustainable
resource use choices and in the long-term adaptive management
of complex large and small ecosystems.
ronmental agenda as a debate about means not ends. There are always dissenting
voices. E.g., Bjorn Lomberg, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE
REAL STATE OF THE WORLD (2001).
2. A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental Law "Rule of Law" Litigation,
17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237 (2000).
3. DANIEL C. EsTY & MARIAN R. CHERTOW, THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT
GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 1 (1997).
4. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA" Monitoring and Man-
aging Government's Environmental Compliance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 93 (2002.)
612 [Vol. 19
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/6
20021 FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL "RULE OF LAW" 613
The second premise is the positive observation that the classic
model of the centralized, expert administrative state is now buf-
feted by powerful centrifugal forces. This is not a new or original
observation, but in recent years many observers have noted with
varying levels of enthusiasm that there is considerable collabora-
tive vertical and horizontal power sharing.5 The two trends are
closely connected. Collaborative power sharing is seen as a way to
supply the creativity, vision and implementation resources that
the federal government no longer seems able to provide.6 The sec-
ond positive premise is that as we move more and more toward
biodiversity conservation, the regulation of land becomes equally,
if not more, important than the regulation of water bodies and air-
sheds. The rub is that the federal government's leverage is the
weakest at this point and common law property expectations are
harder compared to those connected to the use of airsheds and wa-
tercourses as sinks. The net result is that many foresee more
"deals" among the principal stakeholders interested in a specific
resource or geographical area and fewer top down regulatory
solutions.
The downward devolution or the "decentering" of government
engenders deep passions, and positions which cut across tradi-
tional political boundaries. Many on the right support it in the
name of an arid, abstract federalism often divorced from how
power is actually exercised, shared and constrained, and many en-
vironmentalists fiercely oppose it as a disguised effort to roll back
thirty plus years of environmental protection. To them, devolu-
tion is yet another sordid chapter in the long history of appeals to
states rights to justify the abdication of national responsibility.7
The debate is much more complex. Many in the environmental
community embrace the idea of place-specific stakeholder negoti-
ated management solutions, for reasons of necessity. Local, con-
sensus-based "deals" are the only alternative to the rollback of
federal environmental mandates. This is why Secretary of the In-
5. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) and Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders:
Limits on Collaboration as Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411
(2000).
6. The pros and cons of collaborative decision-making as well as the implications
that it holds for environmental lawyers are perceptively discussed in Bradley Kark-
kanien, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of Collaboration, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 555
(2002).
7. See Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Compar-
ative Constitutional Experience, 51 DuKE L.J. 223 (2001).
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terior Bruce Babbitt promoted Habitat Conservation Plans in the
1990s as a way of reforming the Endangered Species Act from
within.8 Positive cases do, however, exist.9
My 2000 Garrison lecture set out the rise of deal making and
briefly addressed some of the legal questions that a decentered
government raises. I focused primarily on the limitations of the
classic "rule of law" lawsuit in an era of collaborative deal making.
At the end of the lecture, I suggested a role for future "rule of law"
lawsuits in deal making, but I did not offer a detailed alternative
to the classic lawsuit. Historically, NGO suits have been used to
gain a tactical advantage in a multi-front campaign. For example,
in his celebrated book, Defending the Environment1 ° , Joseph Sax
justified such suits as legislative remands. Courts were to invali-
date agency actions to give the legislature a chance to make a
more informed resource allocation choice.
In this brief addendum, I discuss a recent case partially inval-
idating an Endangered Species Act'1 (ESA) Section 10 Habitat
Conservation Plan (HCP) deal as an example of the different func-
tion that "rule of law" suits may play in the future. I argue that
deals have both a high upside, long term sustained management,
and an equally high downside, the gradual erosion of biodiversity.
Thus, there is a need for courts to play a role in promoting respon-
sible deal making.
One of the central questions that collaborative government
raises is when is a deal really a deal? For private parties, the in-
centive to enter a deal is to obtain some form of immunity from
subsequent government enforcement and litigation. For govern-
ments, the primary incentive is to obtain what litigation cannot
directly produce, land, money and a commitment to some form of
long-term, adaptive management. At the present time, the immu-
nity consists of the ability to shape the compliance standard to
allow more activity than the pre-deal regulatory structure would
allow and the ability to shift the costs of unforeseen compliance
problems to the government. To be effective over the long run, the
deal must establish sufficient compliance duties to maximize the
8. See Joseph L. Sax, Using Property Rights to Attack Environmental Protection,
14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999).
9. See Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A
Repartorial Fragment of Contemporary History, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2377 (2000).
10. See generally, JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR
CITIZEN ACTION (1970).
11. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1973).
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possibility of achieving the desired environmental results. Thus,
there is an important role for judicial policing of the initial deal as
well as its subsequent implementation.
It is too early to definitely identify the full contours of the ju-
dicial role because we do not have enough experience with suc-
cessful deals to develop the necessary criteria. The judicial role
must proceed from two inconsistent premises. First, the court
must assume the parties negotiated in good faith to comply with
the basic objectives of the applicable laws. Therefore, a deal to
save species must be structured to achieve that end, and a deal to
enhance the hydrologic and biological integrity of a watershed
must be similarly structured. Second, the court must recognize
that existing laws are not well designed to address issues such as
biodiversity conservation and thus must be adapted to this end, at
least until Congress takes up the issue of creating the next gener-
ation of environmental laws. The adaptation will require a rela-
tively high level of ambiguity because of the inevitable scientific
uncertainty about the efficacy of the conservation instruments
adopted and the need to leave some crucial issues, such as future
funding and the consequences of unforeseen conditions, such as
species decline unresolved.
The court will have to decide if there is a sufficient "core deal"
to address effectively the environmental problems that gave rise
to the negotiation. Often, it will not be prudent to invalidate the
entire deal and require the parties to start over, but rather it will
be useful to spotlight the issues that need to be resolved. National
Wildlife Federation v. Babbitt12 is a possible bell weather of the
new judicial review. In Babbitt, a well-respected federal district
judge, David Levi, with extensive experience in environmental
law, demonstrated great sensitivity to the dynamics of modern
deal making by spotlighting where the parties papered over too
much in the rush to get a deal.
The Fish and Wildlife Service and various governmental units
negotiated an ambitious regional HCP for a 53,000-acre, largely
undeveloped, flood plain near Sacramento, California. Develop-
ment will occur because local and perhaps federal flood control
protection will trigger the usual moral hazard cycle: Flood protec-
tion will increase development, which in turn will increase the
amount of flood damage when the inevitable "extraordinary" flood
12. See National Wildlife Federation v. Bruce Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (E.D.
Ca. 2000).
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occurs. Both humans and non-humans love California. California
is one of the world's endangered species hot spots and several
listed species live in the basin. Unlike HCPs, which start with the
assembly of a large block of public and private land, the Natomas
Basin plan obligated a multi-jurisdictional agency, the Natomas
Basin Conservancy, to assemble several connected blocks of land
funded by future land development fees. The pay off for the plan
was the Fish and Wildlife Service's issuance of a Biological Opin-
ion that authorized umbrella incidental take permits to several
local governments and water districts.
To induce sufficient developer and local community support,
HCPs have to balance front-end development opportunities, which
are immunized from a taking suit under Section 9, with the imple-
mentation of a multi-species conservation plan over a long period
of time. The trick is to find a level of habitat destruction and con-
sequent species decline consistent with the maintenance of the
ecosystem's functions. This would include the support of endan-.
gered species over time. To do this, the plan has to make crucial
risk assumptions in the face of multiple levels of scientific and in-
stitutional uncertainty. The Natomas Basin Plan's crucial as-
sumptions were: (1) only about a third of the basin would in fact
be developed and (2) future threats to the species continued sur-
vival as development took place around the reserve system could
be minimized through aggressive adaptive management.
The National Wildlife Federation challenged the basic theory
that Incidental Take Permits could precede a complete plan based
on extensive scientific research. Specifically, it argued that the
Plan must estimate the number of species and the number that
will be taken. Since this is extremely difficult to do, the plan
would most likely never go forward. The court brushed this aside
by holding that the HCP met the minimum statutory require-
ments under the Chevron deference standard. Plaintiffs also chal-
lenged the Service's projection (speculation) that only 17,500 acres
of the basin would be developed and the consequent conclusion
that a combination of reserve and retention of agricultural land
would be sufficient to protect the covered species. These were
found to be within the Service's expert discretion because they
concerned "the uncertainties inherent in the market-based mitiga-
tion mechanism employed by an HCP" and an inevitable part of
the complicated decision making that led to the HCP.
Instead of invalidating the key risk assumptions behind the
plan, the court zeroed in on the weakest deals, the disconnect be-
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tween a regional plan and the lack of regional responsibility, and
the Department of Interior's inability to nail down adequate fund-
ing.13 First, the court invalidated the Service's conclusion that the
amount of the mitigation fee would be sufficient to acquire the
necessary habitat because it was unsupported by substantial evi-
dence and therefore arbitrary. Administrative law purists may
object to combining an adjudicative and rule making or informal
decision standard but the court in effect enforced the Supreme
Court's Nollan-Dolan1 4 standard. Nollan-Dolan require that land
exactions be based on a reasonable showing of need and that the
exaction is proportionate to need generated by the land use activ-
ity. By failing to demonstrate compliance with the standard, the
Department of Interior may have equally over or underestimated
the necessary level of exaction. Likewise, the court held that the
Department could not issue a permit after the city refused to as-
sume financial liability for the implementation of the plan.
The Service's willingness to go ahead without an adequate
funding mechanism also extended to its willingness to approve a
regional HCP premised on the participation of only one public ac-
tor, the City of Sacramento, when in fact the success ultimately
depended on multi-jurisdictional cooperation. This was fatal for
several reasons including the failure to discuss the effect on the
reserve and corridor design, if only the city participated in the
plan. In short, the Service's failure to consider whether the sur-
vival of the species will be put at risk by the City's permit, if the
regional mitigation approach of the HCP is not available, is arbi-
trary and capricious. National Wildlife Federation's primary vir-
tue is that it both warns the parties to a deal about the dangers of
excessive compromise and provides a road map for lawyers in fu-
ture negotiations.
13. See John Kostyack, NWF v. Babbitt: Victory for Smart Growth and Imperiled
Wildlife, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10712 (2001). See generally William Rodgers, The Myth of
Win-Win: Misdiagnosis in the Business of Reassembling Nature, 42 ARiz. L. REV. 297
(2000).
14. See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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